How people make decisions involving compliance with ethical guidelines and organizational regulations has been an important focus of research in such diverse fields as economics, philosophy, psychology, accounting, law, and management. Prior work has identified a number of important factors that affect such compliance decisions (see, for comprehensive reviews, Ford and Richardson, 1994; Loe et al., 2000) . This paper focuses on the role played by different systems of compensation.
A large literature based on seminal work by Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973) relates compliance with the law to economic costs and benefits. The application of this model to cheating within organizations has been dubbed the "rational cheater" model (Nagin et al., 2002) . In a fascinating field experiment, Nagin et al. (2002) find evidence that some employees of a telephone solicitation company respond to a reduction in monitoring with an increase in cheating, while others, perhaps motivated by conscience or guilt, do not. Rickman and Witt (2007) reach similar conclusions in their study of employee theft in the UK.
A considerable theoretical and empirical literature on tax evasion applies the rational cheater model to examining the relationship between the decision to evade and such enforcement mechanisms as the audit rate, audit selection methods, and the penalty if caught. In addition, this literature studies the relationship between compliance and other features of the tax system such as the tax rate and the use to which tax revenues are put (e.g., Alm et al., 1990; 1992a; 1992b; 1992c; 1993a; 1993b; Beron et al., 1992; Boylan and Sprinkle, 2001; Cadsby et al., 2006; Feld and Tyran, 2002; Moser et al., 1995) . Alm and McKee (1998) provide an excellent review of this literature, and argue that many of the results from laboratory experiments on tax compliance are directly applicable to compliance with regulations within organizations. For example, experimental work on the effects of different tax enforcement mechanisms can be applied to the use of analogous schemes by organizations.
However, the level of compliance within organizations does not depend solely on enforcement mechanisms. It may also be influenced by the incentives created through an organization's compensation system either to act in accordance with or to disregard company regulations and generally accepted ethical practices. The literature on tax evasion has considered how incentives created by different tax rates or tax systems may affect compliance, but this is not directly applicable to the analogous issue of how compensation systems may create incentives that tempt employees to cheat.
Production is not always easy to observe, and pay is often based upon employee reports of hours worked or tasks accomplished. For example, lawyers, accountants and business consultants are often paid based on self-reported billable hours. Automobile and appliance service technicians charge customers based on their own diagnosis of the problem and of the resultant repairs. Similarly, physicians in many countries are paid based upon their own diagnosis of illness and prescribed treatment. Many executives are paid based on the financial performance of their organizations, which in turn can be manipulated by false or misleading reports. Nagin et al. (2002) , as mentioned above, discuss a case in which telephone canvassers soliciting money for non-profit organizations receive commissions based on self-reports of contribution pledges.
Recently, reacting to a number of well-publicized business scandals involving false sales reports to obtain rewards under goal-setting compensation systems (Degeorge, et al., 1999; Jensen, 2001) , Michael Jensen (2003) has argued controversially that the use of production or sales targets in compensation formulas encourages people to lie or misrepresent their performance with serious consequences for firm productivity and profitability. A recent survey on global economic crime by PricewaterhouseCoopers provides support for this argument. Specifically, respondents to the survey identified the top two reasons for the increase in accounting fraud between 2007 and 2009 as "financial targets being more difficult to achieve" (47%) and "senior management wanting to report a desired level of financial performance" (25%) (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2009) . Urging that such targets be replaced by linear pay-for-performance (PFP) compensation systems in which people are rewarded in direct proportion to their productivity, Jensen asserts:
Everyone can benefit by bringing this game to an end, and I believe it starts by eliminating the use of targets in compensation systems, and in particular by eliminating the use of budgets as targets in compensation systems. Simply put this means creating linear pay-for-performance compensation systems (Jensen, 2003, p. 405) .
However, it is not obvious that adopting linear PFP would actually give people incentives to report their performance truthfully. As long as people are paid on the basis of performance, linearly or otherwise, they may still have an incentive to exaggerate their performance. Indeed, it is possible that a linear PFP system would encourage bigger lies about the number of items produced or sold within a budgetary period. If one is close to a target under a target-based system, one need claim only to have produced or sold a few more items to reach the target, thereby obtaining a large financial bonus. To obtain a similarly increased payoff under a linear piece-rate system, one might have to make far more exaggerated claims relative to actual performance. Such exaggerated claims could damage the sales and production planning processes, perhaps even more seriously than under a target-based system.
A recent study by Schweitzer et al. ( 2 0 0 4 ) e x a m i n e d t a r g e t -b a s e d production and compensation systems in the laboratory. They showed that a target-based system produces more lies about performance than simply paying people a lump sum and asking them to do their best. Grover and Hui (2005) also reported that people are more likely to overreport their performance level when performance pressure is created by linking financial rewards to achieving performance goals, while Freeman and Gelber (2010) found overreporting in the context of both single-and multiple-prize tournaments. More generally, several scholars in management and economics have warned that goal setting as a management strategy may induce unintended, undesirable, and sometimes dire consequences including unethical behavior (e.g., Barsky, 2008; Ordóñez et al., 2009a Ordóñez et al., , 2009b . These claims have proven highly controversial, as evidenced by a recent vigorous exchange of views in Academy of Management Perspectives (Ordóñez et al., 2009a (Ordóñez et al., , 2009b Latham and Locke, 2009; Locke and Latham, 2009 ). The one thing that these authors agree on is that systematic scholarly research is the best way to shed further light on such issues.
While existing studies document cheating under performance pay, and compare target-based pay with compensation that, being independent of performance, offers no financial incentive to cheat, none has compared targetbased incentives to other performance-based schemes. In contrast, this study uses a controlled laboratory experiment with salient financial incentives to compare the exaggerations and misrepresentations that occur under target-based compensation with those that arise under both linear piece-rate and tournament-based bonus settings.
Before abandoning target-based in favor of alternative PFP compensation systems, it is important to examine empirically whether doing so will actually reduce misrepresentation. This is difficult to do in an actual business setting due to the hidden nature of misrepresentation and the many uncontrollable factors that might affect misrepresentation in the field. In contrast, a well-designed laboratory experiment allows us to observe directly the degree of misrepresentation under the three compensation systems-target based, linear piece rate, and tournament-while controlling for other confounding factors.
The next section outlines the theoretical motivation for the study, utilizing a simple illustrative model of the benefits and costs of cheating. This is followed by a section outlining the experimental methodology and another section discussing the experimental results. A conclusion follows.
Theory

A Model
The Jensen hypothesis that target-based compensation encourages cheating and misrepresentation relative to linear PFP is based on implicit assumptions about the cost of cheating to individuals and its relationship to the amount by which they cheat. 1 We illustrate this with a simple model of cheating behavior. This model is not intended to encompass all possibilities, but rather has the more modest objective of illustrating some circumstances under which Jensen's arguments are correct and others in which they are not. Like the models of Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973) , our model compares the benefits and costs of cheating. In contrast to Becker and Ehrlich, the costs in our model are psychological costs such as the guilt experienced as a result of cheating rather than the expected costs of being caught and punished. Our model bears some resemblance to the one presented by Nagin et al. (2002) . However, we focus more explicitly on the precise relationship between guilt and the amount of cheating and its interaction with the compensation system. In order to focus on this relationship, we do not include any system of monitoring, enforcement, or punishment in either our model or our experiment.
Suppose that an individual is working at a job that rewards each employee based on the number of self-reported units produced within a given time period. This may be thought of as a three-stage game. In stage one, the employee decides how much effort to exert. Individual output, q, is determined by a production function q = f(e, ε), where e is effort and ε is a random shock. The random shock represents the possibility of being tired or alert, distracted or focused, or any other random factor that could have an impact on the transformation of effort into performance during a particular time period. In stage two, the person finds out q, the amount she or he has produced. In stage three, the person decides whether and by how much to misrepresent his or her personal performance. This paper focuses on the stage-three misrepresentation decision conditional on the realized level of output, q.
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Let c represent the number of overclaims (c stands for cheating) made by the individual in question. Overclaims may be beneficial in that under a PFP system, higher output leads to higher pay. Higher pay in turn leads to higher utility. In particular, the utility of the financial payoff is given by U[P(q+c)], where P is the monetary payoff contingent on the reported performance level. The precise form of P(q+c) is determined exogenously by the payment scheme. This is the treatment variable in our experiment. In all cases, P(0) = 0. For simplicity, we normalize
G(c) represents the disutility resulting from any psychological costs that may be associated with cheating. For simplicity, we refer to such costs 1 Although costs of cheating are not discussed explicitly in Jensen (2001 Jensen ( , 2003 , his argument is not consistent with costless cheating. If cheating were costless, linear piece-rate schemes would produce unlimited amounts of cheating rather than a reduction in cheating as Jensen argues. 2 The experimental results find no significant differences between output levels under the three schemes.
collectively as guilt.
3 Guilt is modeled as a function of the number of overclaimed output units, c. G(0) = 0 since guilt arises only if cheating occurs.
4 G(c) is allowed to be discontinuous at 0. This allows for the possibility that for some people even a tiny amount of cheating may result in a large amount of guilt. However, it is assumed to be continuous elsewhere. G′(c) ≥ 0 for c > 0, indicating that guilt does not decrease as the amount of cheating rises.
5 U[P(q+c)] and G(c) are assumed separable.
In the target-based setting, P(q+c) is discontinuous. Suppose a person produces q t , and q t is less than the preannounced target, t. Then P(q t +c) = 0 if c+q < t and P(q t +c) = B if q t +c ≥ t, where B is a bonus that is received contingent on the person achieving the target. When faced with a decision about whether or not to cheat, an individual compares the benefits of the bonus with the psychological cost of the guilt. Define c* = t−q t . Then if U(B) > G(c*), the benefits exceed the costs and the individual will overclaim c* units. In contrast, if U(B) < G(c*), the costs exceed the benefits and the individual will not cheat. When U(B) = G(c*), the person is indifferent, and the decision may go either way. Notice that if a person produces an amount greater than or equal to the target, c* ≤ 0, and B is received even in the absence of cheating. Hence, there is no opportunity to cheat for financial benefit in this instance.
In any group of people, G(c*) is likely to differ between individuals since different people will generally have different guilt responses to a given number of overclaims. However, since G′(c) ≥ 0 for each individual, a given person with an unknown guilt function is more likely to cheat by making c* overclaims, the closer she or he is to the target, i.e., the smaller is c*. This is because a smaller c* implies less guilt. This prediction has already received empirical support in the work of Schweitzer et al. (2004) . We reexamine this issue in our setting. HYPOTHESIS 1 (H1): Under a target-based compensation scheme, one is more likely to cheat the closer one is to the predetermined target.
In the linear piece-rate setting, P(q l +c) = k·(q l +c) is the monetary payoff resulting from reported performance, where k is the amount paid per unit of reported output. If U[k·(q l +c)] − U(k·q l ) < G(c) for all c > 0, there will be no cheating. In contrast, 3 We use the word "guilt" as a shorthand way of referring to guilt, shame, fear and any other psychological costs that may be associated with cheating. It is beyond the scope of this paper to separately identify the roles played by different kinds of psychological costs. 4 A referee has pointed out that assuming guilt is a function of how much one overclaims is critical. If instead, guilt were a function of how much one gains from overclaiming, the amount of guilt experienced in the tournament and target-based settings would be very different. 5 No restrictions are placed upon G″(c) because it seems plausible for the marginal disutility of cheating to either rise or fall with the amount of cheating. Notice that, in contrast to the target-based setting, cheating in the linear piece-rate setting always leads to a higher payoff regardless of the amount actually produced.
Comparing Cheating Under the Target-Based and Linear Piece-Rate Settings
When comparing target-based and linear piece-rate compensation schemes, we assume that B ≥ k·t and therefore that B ≥ k·c* for all possible c* since, by definition, c* = t−q t . This simply means that the bonus under the target-based scheme is at least equal to the amount one would earn if one were to report exactly the targeted amount under the piece-rate scheme. 6 PROPOSITION 1: If it is more beneficial for a person to overclaim c* units than to overclaim zero units in the linear piece-rate setting, it will also be beneficial to overclaim c* units in the target-based setting. However, the converse is not necessarily true.
PROOF: Overclaiming c* units in the linear setting in preference to overclaiming zero units implies
7 Thus, U(B) > G(c*) and c* units will be overclaimed in the target setting.
The converse need not be true. Overclaiming c* units in the target-based
A firm with a given amount of money available for compensation would in fact set B > k·t when moving between schemes. As discussed below, we run one piece-rate treatment in which B = k·t and a second piece-rate treatment in which B > k·t. In the latter treatment, k is selected so that the amount of money paid out under the piece rate would be approximately equal to the amount paid out under the target-based scheme if nobody were to cheat.
G(c*).
Hence overclaiming c* units in the target-based setting does not imply that an individual would overclaim c* units in the linear piece-rate setting.
Intuitively, the financial incentives to overclaim c* units of output are at least as high and generally higher in the target-based case than in the linear case. This is perhaps the basis for Jensen's prediction that targets lead to substantially more cheating than do linear pay systems. However, it is important to note that this general prediction is not implied by the theoretical model. Although a preference for overclaiming c* rather than zero units in the linear case but not in the target-based case is ruled out by our simple model, every other conceivable outcome is possible, depending upon the shapes and positions of the U[P(q+c)] and G(c) functions, which in turn depend on individual attitudes towards earnings and guilt. Thus, it is impossible based on the theoretical model alone to predict whether target-based or linear financial incentives will lead to more cheating. 
No a g Not possible h i Table 1 
In case d, there are c* overclaims in both the linear and target-based cases. It occurs under identical conditions to case c except that ĉ = c*. In case e, there are more overclaims in the linear case than in the target-based case. It occurs under identical conditions to case c except that ĉ > c*.
In case f, there are unbounded overclaims in the linear case and c* overclaims in the target-based case. This requires
there is no cheating in the target-based case, but there is cheating at ĉ < c* in the linear case. This occurs when:
In case h, there is no cheating in the target-based case, but there is cheating at ĉ > c* in the linear case. It occurs under identical conditions to case g except that ĉ > c*. Finally, in case i, there is no cheating in the target-based case, but unbounded overclaims in the linear case. This requires
Different people will generally possess differing U[P(c)] and G(c) functions, representing differing psychological reactions to changes in earnings and to different levels of cheating. At different times, 0 < c* ≤ t will also vary even for the same individual, depending on his or her performance in a given pay period. If most people belong to cases b and/or c, Jensen's hypothesis will hold and cheating will be greater under target-based than under linear piece-rate compensation schemes. Figure 1 illustrates case b, which is consistent with Jensen's prediction. If most people belong to cases a and/or d, there will be little difference between the two. Finally, if most people belong to cases e, f, g, h, and/or i, Jensen's hypothesis will not hold and there will be more cheating under the linear than under the target-based scheme. Figure 2 illustrates case h, which is inconsistent with Jensen's prediction. Generally speaking, the Jensen cases involve relatively low guilt levels associated with low levels of cheating, and an increase in guilt that accelerates as cheating rises. The opposite case, in which more cheating occurs under the linear scheme, can involve a relatively high guilt level at low cheating levels or relatively slow increases in guilt as cheating rises. 9 Furthermore, the analysis above assumes that G(c) is independent of the compensation scheme. However, this may not be the case. For example, it is possible that a scheme perceived as being unfair would mitigate guilt. For example, a person who works diligently and comes close to, but does not reach the target, may react with anger at the perceived unfairness and use this perceived 8 Each of these cases is consistent with some possible individual utility and guilt functions regardless of whether or not actual output under the target-based scheme, q t , is equal to output under the linear scheme, q l . In fact, the experimental results show no significant productivity differences under the two schemes. 9 Note that these general descriptions are not exhaustive of the possibilities discussed more formally above. 
unfairness as a justification to cheat. Clearly, the validity of the Jensen prediction is ultimately an empirical issue, and the primary focus of this paper is accordingly an empirical examination of this issue.
HYPOTHESIS 2 (the Jensen Hypothesis) (H2): According to Jensen (2001 Jensen ( , 2003 , more cheating will occur under a target-based than under a linear piece-rate compensation scheme.
Comparing Cheating Under the Target-Based and Tournament Settings
The target-based compensation scheme examined in this study is binary, rewarding reported performance if and only if the prespecified target is reported as having been reached. An analogous binary tournament rewards reported performance if and only if it is at or above a prespecified percentile relative to other participants. Suppose, for comparability, that this percentile is chosen so that if performance is reported honestly approximately the same percentage of participants will obtain the bonus as in the target-based scheme. Then the two schemes differ in two major respects. First, the target-based scheme presents participants with a certain production target. Once a participant learns how much she or he has produced in a given pay period, the participant knows whether or not the target has actually been achieved and, if not, how many overclaims the participant would have to make to receive the bonus nonetheless. In contrast, in the tournament, a participant does not know either whether she or he has produced enough to obtain the bonus without cheating, or how many overclaims, if any, would be necessary to obtain it. This is because the participant knows neither how much other participants will actually produce, nor how much they will cheat. Thus, while the payoff from a given amount of cheating is certain under the target-based scheme, it is uncertain under the tournament scheme. Predicting how this will affect individual cheating behavior is difficult since the expected returns to such behavior depend upon expectations about the uncertain behavior of others as well as upon individual attitudes toward risk.
Second, under the target-based scheme, cheating comes at the expense of the firm's owners who must pay out more in bonuses. Analogously, in a laboratory experiment, it comes at the expense of the experimenter's research grant. In contrast, in a tournament, cheating is at the expense of fellow participants since it causes bonuses to be given to one participant rather than to another. To the extent that participants feel more solidarity and less social distance between themselves and the other participants than between themselves and the owners of their firm or between themselves and the experimenter, they may be more willing to cheat under a target-based scheme than in a tournament. This latter point gives rise to a somewhat speculative third hypothesis.
HYPOTHESIS 3 (H3): There will be more cheating under the target-based compensation scheme than under the tournament compensation scheme.
Experimental Design
Participants were recruited at a medium-sized Canadian university by means of email solicitation through the Bachelor of Commerce program listserv. Potential participants were told that they were participating in a study about workplace issues, and that they would be paid. They were not given any other details prior to the experiment. All 208 participants were undergraduates and majors in economics or other business subjects. There were 97 males and 111 females with an average age of 20.15 years and a standard deviation of 1.60 years. A widely used anagram-creation game (e.g., Cadsby et al., 2007; Schweitzer et al., 2004; Vance and Colella, 1990 ) was employed as the experimental task.
Upon arrival, participants were randomly divided into two groups of equal size. One group was instructed to stay in the room while the other group was taken to an adjacent room. The two groups followed exactly the same experimental instructions and went through the session in precisely the same way. Instructions were read to the participants while they followed along on their own copies. The instructions informed the participants that they would begin by playing two practice rounds and subsequently would play seven experimental rounds followed by a final trial round. The practice rounds were designed to familiarize participants with the experimental procedure and task. The final trial round's purpose is discussed below. Participants were paid based only on the data from the experimental rounds, and we use only these data in our analysis.
The instructions informed the participants that they would be provided with a prepared workbook containing the anagrams and a separate record sheet on which to register their performance. Each anagram was presented on a separate page of the workbook. Participants were told that they would be given exactly one minute to make as many words as possible from each anagram. A bell signaled the beginning and end of each round. Between the practice rounds and the experimental rounds there was a pause for questions. Otherwise, each time the bell rang, participants were to turn the page and move on to the next round. Participants were not permitted to look ahead to future pages or to go back to previous pages. Our research assistants carefully monitored adherence to these instructions. To ensure anonymity, participants wrote their assigned participant numbers, but not their names, on the covers of their workbooks.
The instructions also described the procedures that would be followed once all the rounds were complete. First, participants would be asked to fill out a short demographic questionnaire. The purpose of the questionnaire was to provide the experimenters with information regarding the gender, age, and first language of each participant. Second, participants would be asked to submit their workbooks to the experimenter, who would in turn hand them to another participant sitting in an adjacent room. Each participant would then be asked to check the work of another participant, whose workbook was given to him or her at random. To accomplish this task, each participant would be given a list of all known correct words and a Scrabble dictionary in case any correct words were missing from the list. The specific instructions were as follows: "At the end of the session, your performance will be checked by another person playing the same game. At the same time, you will be asked to check the words created by another participant. That participant will not be the same person checking your words." Participants knew that a $3 word-checking fee would be paid to compensate them for doing this cross-checking task.
Third, participants were informed that after the cross-checking was completed, each workbook would be returned to the participant to whom it belonged according to the participant number on the cover page. At that point, participants would be permitted to check over their own workbook to make sure that all the correct words had been marked "correct" and that all the incorrect words had been marked "incorrect." They were given permission to correct any mistakes made by the rater. This system of cross-checking enabled us to distinguish between passive misrepresentation in which a participant simply acceded to an error made by the rater and active misrepresentation in which a participant overruled the rater to make an incorrect claim. Fourth, participants would be asked to record the number of correct words they had created on the performance record sheet. Fifth, they were instructed to tear off the covers of their workbooks, to deposit the covers and the workbooks into two separate sealed boxes, and to bring their performance record sheets to another room one by one to get paid according to the performance record and compensation scheme plus the $3 word-checking fee.
Unbeknownst to participants, the final trial round contained a unique set of seven letters for each participant that we used to match participants' workbooks with their self-reported performance records. Thus, we could compare actual productivity to claimed productivity for each participant by round after the experiment's completion. 10 However, since neither the performance records nor the coverless workbooks contained player names or ID numbers, we could not match either to particular individuals.
The specific compensation scheme was the treatment variable of the study. Initially, we ran three experimental treatments as follows. 1) Linear Piece-rate ($0.40) : Each participant was paid $3 for word checking and $0.40 for each word they created in the game. 2) Target-Based Bonus: Each participant was paid $3 for word checking and $3.60 for each of the seven experimental rounds in which she or he created nine words or more. Nine words was the 85th percentile performance level in our pre-test data, which were gathered in a piece-rate setting.
3) Tournament-Based Bonus: Each participant was paid $3 for word checking and $3.60 for each of the seven experimental rounds in which his or her performance was at or above the 85th percentile, relative to other participants in the same session.
11 One session was devoted to each treatment with between 50 and 56 participants per session.
The parameters for the piece-rate and target-based treatments were chosen so that a person with nine correct words would make the same amount of money under the two compensation schemes. However, both a person making fewer than nine words and a person making more than nine words would earn more under the $0.40 piece rate than under the nine-word target-based scheme.
12 Accordingly, expected earnings and the expected wage bill would be considerably larger under the $0.40 piece rate than under the $3.60 nine-word bonus. After running these two treatments, we obtained data on the average number of correct words produced under the $0.40 piece rate and the average amount that would have been earned with no cheating under the target-based scheme. We used these data to calculate a piece rate that would result in the same expected earnings and wage bill as the $3.60 bonus treatment on the assumption that the lower piece rate would not affect performance. That piece rate was $0.10. To ensure that any observed differences in cheating behavior were caused by the different kinds of compensation rather than by differences in expected earnings, we then ran a fourth treatment with a $0.10 piece rate. There were 50 participants in that session.
Results
We first examined whether demographic variables (age, gender, and first language) had any influence on our key dependent variables representing productivity and cheating behavior. We found no significant relationships between any of the demographic variables and the dependent variables. This is 11 Please contact the authors for the complete instructions used in each of the experimental treatments. 12 For example, a person making eight words would earn $3.20 under the $0.40 piece rate, while earning zero under the target-based scheme. A person making ten words would earn $4.00 under the piece rate, but only $3.60 under the target-based scheme. consistent with the finding reported in Schweitzer et al. (2004) , who used a similar population and the same experimental task. As a result, we pooled the data from all the demographic groups for the remainder of the analysis.
We then examined productivity under the four treatments. Productivity is defined as the number of correct words a participant created during the seven experimental rounds. These numbers are reported in the top row of Table 2 . Since the productivity numbers are count data, we used a negative binomial regression to compare each pair of treatments with each other (Hilbe, 2007) . The dependent variable in each regression was the number of correct words for each participant, while the independent variable was a treatment dummy variable. The top row of the lower portion of Table 2 reports incidence rate ratios (IRRs) and p-values for each comparison. The IRRs are exponentiated coefficients from the negative binomial regressions, i.e., IRR i = EXP (β i ), where β is the estimated coefficient and i represents the ratio of the two treatments being compared. Each estimated IRR can be interpreted as the multiplicative factor by which productivity is predicted to change between the two treatments being compared. The null hypothesis of no treatment effect implies β i = 0, or equivalently, IRR i = 1.
Productivity was similar under the four treatments, and the null hypothesis that it was identical could not be rejected at conventional levels of significance for any pair of treatments. 13 The failure of the target-based bonus to produce higher performance is similar to the findings of Schweitzer et al. (2004) who found no significant differences in productivity between their treatments with and without goals regardless of whether or not financial incentives were linked to the goals. Schweitzer et al. (2004) argue that this is likely due to the one-minute limit on the anagram task, a design feature that our study shares. They cite Locke and Latham (1990) , who maintain that goals affect performance by encouraging persistence over time, and Vance and Colella (1990), who find a significant relationship between goal setting and performance over periods longer than one minute. It is perhaps more surprising that we found no significant productivity differences between our $0.40 and $0.10 piece-rate treatments. It appeared that in both cases participants were highly motivated to work hard to earn as much money as possible during each one-minute round of play. Although the higher piece rate gave people more reason to work hard, they appeared to be producing to the best of their ability already under the lower rate, leaving no room for further improvement. 13 Conventional t-tests of difference in means and nonparametric Mann-Whitney tests all yield inferences that are virtually identical to those from the tests based on negative binomial regressions reported for count data throughout this study. In the case of every negative binomial regression reported, the alternative Poisson specification was rejected by a likelihood ratio test with a p-value of 0.000. Therefore, to conserve space, we report only the tests based on negative binomial regressions for count data throughout the paper. Note: The estimated negative binomial regression coefficients, not reported here to save space, indicate the fitted difference in the log of expected counts between the two treatments. The estimated IRRs reported here are exponentiated coefficients, i.e., IRR i = EXP(β i ), where β is the estimated coefficient and i represents the ratio of the two treatments being compared. They may be interpreted as the multiplicative factor by which the dependent variable is predicted to change as a result of the specified treatment effect. Thus, the null hypothesis that β i = 0 is equivalent to IRR i = 1, implying that there is no treatment effect.
In the absence of cheating and exclusive of the $3.00 checking fee, participants would have earned on average $16.62 under the $0.40 piece rate, $4.18 under the target-based bonus, $3.53 under the tournament and $4.43 under the $0.10 piece rate. As expected, the $0.40 piece rate produced significantly higher honest earnings than the other three treatments did (p = 0.000 in each case). However, honest earnings did not differ significantly in pairwise comparisons between the other three treatments. The differences that do exist between honest earnings in these three treatments reflect unavoidable discrepancies between the data used for calibration of the experimental design and performance under the three treatments.
The remainder of our analysis focuses on the overreporting of productivity, i.e., cheating. H1 predicts that under the target-based treatment the probability of cheating behavior will be higher the closer a person's actual output is to the prespecified target, i.e., the lower is c*. We employed the following logit regression to test this hypothesis:
where f is the probability of cheating for financial gain and c* is the difference between the target and the actual number of words created. We used the conditional fixed-effects estimation procedure to deal with the lack of independence in the data due to the repeated measures from each participant over multiple rounds. This procedure removes between-person effects, using only within-person variation to estimate β 1 . It does not estimate a constant term. Since H1 applies only to target-based compensation, we used only the data from the target-based treatment. We ran the regression twice, using two definitions of cheating for financial gain. Under the first definition, a person was classified as having cheated for financial gain in a specific round if his or her actual productivity was less than the target level of nine words, but the person's reported productivity was greater than or equal to nine words. In this case, we utilized only the data from rounds in which a participant created fewer than nine words and hence had the opportunity to cheat for financial gain. 14 The null hypothesis that β 1 = 0 was contrasted with the alternative specified by H1 that a smaller distance to the target, c*, would be associated with a higher probability of cheating. The results of the logit regression reject the null hypothesis in the direction of the specified alternative (β 1 = −0.446, two-tailed p = 0.001).
Recall that each participant's work was graded by another participant, who we refer to as the rater. In some instances, the rater marked incorrect words as correct, and sometimes these rater errors, if left in place by the original participant, resulted in cheating for financial gain under the first definition above. However, these instances of relatively passive cheating were possibly due to carelessness and, even if intentional, may have produced less guilt than the more active and clearly intentional cheating that took place when a rater's correct assessment was modified by the participant, resulting in financial gain. Thus, we also employed a second definition in which a person was classified as having actively cheated for financial gain in a specific round if his or her actual productivity was less than the target level of nine words, the rater correctly indicated that the person had created fewer than nine words, and yet his or her reported productivity was greater than or equal to nine words. In this case, we used only data from rounds in which a participant both created fewer than nine words and was graded as having produced fewer than nine words by the rater, and thus had the opportunity to cheat actively. Under this definition, the null hypothesis is also rejected in the direction of H1 (β 1 = −0.505, two-tailed p = 0.000). These results are consistent both with our model of cheating behavior and with the evidence provided by Schweitzer et al. (2004) .
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H2 predicts more cheating under the target-based scheme than under the piece-rate scheme, while H3 predicts more cheating under the target-based scheme than under the tournament scheme. We compare cheating under the target scheme with cheating under both the two piece-rate schemes and the tournament scheme using several measures of cheating and the negative binomial regression procedure. Table 2 reports measures that are based on the numbers of overclaimed words over the seven experimental rounds. The first of these measures is the total number of overclaimed words. This is defined as the sum over seven rounds of the per-round differences between the number of words reported as being correct and the number of correct words actually created by a participant, whenever such a difference is positive, and zero otherwise. The total number of overclaimed words was more than two and a half times as high in the target-based treatment than in 15 A referee has correctly observed that if there is a correlation between performance and overclaiming probability, this regression will produce biased results. Note that under the fixedeffects procedure, this problem occurs only when the probability of an individual overclaiming is correlated with his or her own performance across rounds since between-person variation is not used to estimate β. We cannot rule out this possibility. However, conditional fixed-effects logit regressions of overclaiming probability on performance in the two piece-rate treatments, where no target exists, fail to reject the null hypothesis of no such relationship. A similar regression using the tournament data does reject the null hypothesis marginally at p = 0.080 for all cheating and more convincingly at p = 0.034 for active cheating, suggesting that higher performance is associated with less rather than more cheating. If such a relationship were to exist in the target data, it would bias the estimate of β 1 in the opposite direction to that predicted by H1 and found in the data despite the possibility of such bias. If such were the case, H1 would still be supported by the data.
any of the other three treatments. This is reflected in the estimated IRRs, which range from 2.74 to 2.93, and which all significantly differ from one, supporting both H2 and H3. 16 The cheating measure reported above lumps together instances in which overclaims involve going along with the rater's assessment with instances in which a participant actively overrules a rater's assessment. The former instances are more likely to be due to lack of vigilance. Even if the participant realizes the rater made an error, it is possible she or he feels less guilt when deferring to another's erroneous judgment than when actively overruling another's accurate judgment to the participant's own benefit. A second measure recognizes this distinction by considering only active cheating, in which a participant overrules the rater's correct assessment of his or her actual output with a higher self-report. The number of active overclaimed words is defined as the sum over seven rounds of the per-round differences between the number of words reported as being correct and the number of correct words actually created by a participant or incorrectly graded as correct by the rater, whenever this difference is positive, and zero otherwise. Once again, both H2 and H3 are strongly supported by the data, which show significantly more active overclaims in the target-based than in the other three treatments.
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Under the piece-rate scheme, an overclaim always has financial implications since pay increases directly with the number of reported words. Under the tournament scheme, overclaims do not always lead to increases in actual pay. However, they do always lead to a higher ex-ante probability of being among the tournament winners and thus receiving a higher payoff. In contrast, an overclaim under the target-based scheme only has financial implications insofar as it results in the achievement of the predetermined target. Suppose the target is nine words. A participant makes seven words. She or he reports nine words. The two overclaimed words result in increased pay. However, suppose this participant reports eight words. She or he overclaims by one word, but there are no financial implications. Similarly, if this participant reports twelve words, two of the overclaimed words have financial implications, but the other three do not. To our 16 Following Schweitzer et al. (2004), we examined, by means of a net measure that subtracts the number of underclaims in the underclaim rounds from the number of overclaims in the overclaim rounds, whether these instances of apparent cheating represented intentional cheating or unintentional carelessness. Since carelessness is likely to result in as many underclaims as overclaims, we might expect this measure to be close to zero in the absence of intentional cheating in all of the treatments. If some of the apparent cheating is due to carelessness, we would expect the careless underclaims to cancel out the careless overclaims. However, both t-tests and MannWhitney tests (since these data included negative values, the negative binomial procedure could not be used) produced results qualitatively identical to the gross results reported in Table 2 . 17 A net measure based on active overclaim words calculated as explained in footnote 16 yielded identical inferences.
surprise, although the majority of overclaims in the target-based case did have financial implications, a considerable number did not. In particular, out of an average of 4.07 active overclaim words per participant in all seven rounds of the target-based treatment, 2.86 had financial implications. The other 1.21 words, 29.7% of the total, did not.
In retrospect, there could be a number of reasons for such non-financial overclaims. First, the participant who makes seven words and decides to cheat in order to get the bonus might be reluctant to report precisely nine words, thinking this might provoke suspicion. She or he may feel it would look less suspicious to report a number of words somewhat in excess of the target. Second, a participant may strongly believe that a word is correct, so much so that she or he feels no need to check it against the word list or dictionary. Nonetheless, the word may not be in the dictionary or may violate the rules of the game by, for example, being a proper noun. The participant erroneously counts it as a correct word, sometimes even in the face of a contrary decision by the rater regardless of whether or not there are financial consequences. Third, it is possible that a participant erroneously uses two forms of the same word, e.g., a singular and a plural form. Although this is clearly not permitted according to the instructions, the participant may not have realized this and thus counted both forms as correct words for reasons that have nothing to do with financial implications. The second and third reasons could also motivate overclaims in the piece-rate and tournament treatments; however, in those treatments they do not stand out as being different from any of the other overclaims since all overclaims may have financial implications.
Should overclaims from the target-based treatment that have no financial implications be counted as cheating when comparing cheating under the three treatments? On balance, we think so. Although the first motivation applies only to the target-based case, the other two apply to all three compensation schemes. Thus, similarly motivated overclaims may occur under all four treatments. It is impossible to remove them from the piece-rate and tournament data. Therefore, in our view, it is best to include them in the target-based data. However, it is nonetheless prudent to undertake an additional comparison that removes such non-financial overclaims to determine whether doing so affects the support we obtained for H2 and H3. To so do, we take account of the fact that financial overclaims are only possible in a given round of the target-based treatment if a participant has created fewer than the nine words specified as the target. There are seven rounds in the experiment. However, if a participant makes nine or more words in three of those rounds, she or he only has the opportunity to make a financial overclaim during the other four rounds.
Thus we define the number of active financial overclaimed words per eligible round for the target-based treatment as follows. First, we calculate the number of active overclaim words that have financial implications for each participant. We then divide this number by the number of rounds in which that participant (i) made fewer than the target of nine words and (ii) was correctly deemed to have made fewer than nine words by the rater, i.e., the rounds in which the participant had the opportunity to actively cheat. The result is the number of active financial overclaimed words per eligible round for that particular participant. Table 2 reports the average of these numbers over all participants as 0.55 words per eligible round. For the piece-rate and tournament treatments, all active overclaims have financial implications and all rounds are eligible rounds in which it is possible to cheat. Therefore, active financial overclaimed words are simply calculated as the number of active overclaimed words divided by the total number of seven rounds. We find more support for H2 and some for H3. The pvalue is significant at 0.047 (0.044) when comparing active financial overclaimed words under the target-based case with those under the $0.40 ($0.10) piece rate. When comparing the target-based with the tournament treatment, it is a marginal p = 0.063.
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So far, we have examined cheating only in terms of the number of overclaimed words under each payment scheme over the course of the experiment. This is like comparing overclaims on units of output or sales over several pay periods. The experiment consisted of seven rounds or work/pay periods. Another way of comparing cheating is to consider the number of rounds in which each participant cheated by making at least one overclaim under each scheme. Table 3 reports the relevant statistics using definitions for overclaim rounds that are analogous to the definitions used for overclaim words. Regardless of the definition employed, the number of rounds per person in which overclaims occurred is more than twice as high under the target-based as under either the two piece-rate or the tournament compensation schemes. Furthermore, the statistical tests based on negative binomial regressions all reject the null hypotheses in favor of H2 and H3. Thus, H2 and H3 both continue to receive strong support when cheating is compared based on the number of rounds in which it occurs rather than on the number of overclaims made over the entire session. A third perspective can be gained by comparing the probability of a person cheating at least once between treatments. Table 4 reports the number and percentage of people who cheated under each treatment for the different definitions of cheating. For the target-based scheme these numbers are between 41% and 54%, while for the $0.40 piece-rate scheme they are between 25% and 33%, for the $0.10 piece-rate scheme between 18% and 22%, and for the tournament scheme between 26% and 32%. We ran the following logit regression separately for each of the various definitions of cheating and for each pair of treatments:
where q is the probability of a person cheating at least once and T is a dummy variable representing the treatment. The results are reported in Table 4 . They again provide support for both H2 and H3, significantly rejecting the null in the direction of these hypotheses for all but one of the cheating definitions. The exception is active financial overclaims. For H2, the p-value was significant (p = 0.001) when comparing the $0.10 piece rate with the target-based case, but marginal (p = 0.079) when the $0.40 piece rate is used in the comparison. For H3, the p-value is marginal at 0.104. Since active financial overclaims and active overclaims are identical by definition under the piece-rate and tournament schemes, these marginal p-values are due to the fact that three fewer people made active financial overclaims than made active overclaims under the target-based scheme. It should be remembered that in the target-based treatment there were fewer opportunities to make active financial overclaims than in the other treatments, since such cheating was only possible in rounds in which a participant made fewer than nine words. Although we did not put forward any hypothesis concerning the relative frequency of cheating between the piece-rate and tournament schemes, we nonetheless report comparisons between these two treatments for each definition of cheating in each of the relevant tables. In no case was there a significant difference. Similarly, there was no significant difference under any definition of cheating when the two different piece rates were compared. This latter result is perhaps rather puzzling. One might expect that a $0.40 piece rate would offer a greater incentive to cheat than would a $0.10 rate. We can only speculate on the reasons for this result. First, a large majority of participants in both piece-rate treatments chose not to cheat at all. Only 33% (25%) of participants (actively) overclaimed under the high piece rate, while just 22% (18% actively) overclaimed under the low piece rate. The small number of cheaters in each treatment does not give much statistical power when comparing cheating under the two treatments. Of course, the primary purpose of this experimental design was not to compare the piece-rate treatments with each other, but to compare both with the targetbased treatment, where the contrast is dramatic. Second, as mentioned earlier, the theoretical discussion assumed that the relationship between guilt and the number of overclaims was constant between treatments. This however may not always be the case. If participants receiving the low piece rate felt less fairly treated than participants receiving the high piece rate, some of the former might have felt justified in cheating owing to a perception that their payment was unfairly small. This might have induced more cheating, offsetting the relatively low financial incentive to cheat under the low piece rate.
Despite the strong support for the notion that the target-based scheme provides the greatest temptation to cheat for most participants, this is not necessarily the case for everyone. Since each participant was randomly assigned to just one treatment, we are unable to compare directly the cheating behavior of particular individuals under the different schemes. However, it is interesting to note that the highest number of overclaims by one person, 38, occurred under the $0.40 piece-rate scheme. Since all 52 participants in the $0.40 piece-rate treatment made a total of 79 overclaims, that one person was responsible for fully 48% of the $0.40 piece-rate cheating.
19 Under the tournament scheme, the biggest cheater was responsible for 38% of the overclaims, while under the target-based scheme, the comparable percentage was just 13%. Thus, we must note that while the target-based scheme produced far more cheating overall than the other schemes, some people were nonetheless willing to cheat very substantially under those schemes. system based on relative performance also results in significantly less cheating than a target-based scheme. In addition, as first demonstrated by Schweitzer et al. (2004) , cheating is more likely under a target-based scheme the closer a participant is to the target.
In our study, participants were instructed to report accurately the number of words that they had created. Furthermore, before making a decision about how much to report, each participant received anonymous feedback from another participant selected at random. Thus, in contrast to many experiments on tax evasion, participants were placed in a situation where cheating was really cheating rather than the acceptance of a perceived invitation to gamble (see Cadsby et al., 2006 for a discussion of this issue).
20 In addition, we were able to separate instances of active cheating, in which a participant overruled the verdict of an anonymous rater, from instances where a participant simply went along with a beneficial error made by a rater. Both these active cheating data and the total cheating data strongly support the notion that a prespecified numerical target linked to a financial bonus leads to more cheating than the other compensation schemes.
In our design, there was no chance of being caught. The possibility of an audit was never mentioned during the experiment, and no such audit occurred. Of course, participants may have imagined that if they were to make outlandish claims, they might be challenged. Indeed if any participant under the piece-rate scheme had claimed to have made more words than our budget could tolerate, we would have been forced to depart from the experimental protocol and check the person's claim. 21 As mentioned above, one participant made 38 overclaims in the $0.40 piece-rate treatment. The belief that a ridiculously high claim might be challenged may have kept that person from going further.
We purposely avoided an explicit audit system in order to examine the role played by the interplay of the utility of the financial rewards that may accrue from cheating with the psychological costs that may arise from such dishonest antisocial actions. This may seem contrary to reality, but in fact it is not. PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) 2009 survey of economic crime notes that 43% of respondents believe that the incidence of economic crime has increased over the last two years. The increase in accounting fraud has been particularly significant. This perceived rise in crime is ascribed to increased opportunities and the wide use of incentive compensation. As companies reduce costs by laying off employees whose job was to monitor the performance of others, the latter are more tempted than ever to cheat, given the erosion in their living standards and the uncertainty of their job prospects (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2009) .
If an audit and punishment system were in place, the costs of this system both to the employer and the employee would have to be considered in addition to psychological costs. There is some evidence that the existence of such an audit system might replace in whole or in part the costs of guilt (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000) . The design of an audit system must be considered in conjunction with a particular compensation scheme. For example, an audit system that responds to large self-reports with a higher probability of audit would likely constrain cheating under a piece-rate or tournament system much more effectively than under a target-based system, in which there is no reason to report selling much more than the amount prespecified by the target. Under a target-based system, a random audit of those claiming to have achieved the target would likely be more effective. This is a subject that warrants further study. Michael Jensen's passionate appeal for an end to bonuses based on prespecified numerical targets and their replacement with linear compensation systems cannot be supported by economic theory alone. As we have demonstrated, economic theory is consistent with people cheating either more or less under a target-based than under a linear PFP system. However, Jensen's argument receives strong and unambiguous support from our experimental data. While it is important to take account of other characteristics of compensation systems in addition to their effects on cheating behavior, especially potential effects on effort and output, knowing that the choice of compensation scheme can have an important effect on cheating is clearly an important factor in the design of such systems. Jensen's appeal deserves serious attention. 
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